Architecture and Execution Model for a Survivable Workﬂow Transaction Infrastructure by Thorvaldsson, Haraldur D. & Goldman, Kenneth J.
Washington University in St. Louis 
Washington University Open Scholarship 
All Computer Science and Engineering 
Research Computer Science and Engineering 
Report Number: WUCSE-2005-61 
2005-12-01 
Architecture and Execution Model for a Survivable Workflow 
Transaction Infrastructure 
Haraldur D. Thorvaldsson and Kenneth J. Goldman 
We present a novel architecture and execution model for an infrastructure supporting fault-
tolerant, long-running distributed applications spanning multiple administrative domains. 
Components for both transaction processing and persistent state are replicated across multiple 
servers, en-suring that applications continue to function correctly de-spite arbitrary (Byzantine) 
failure of a bounded number of servers. We give a formal model of application execution, based 
on atomic execution steps, linearizability and a sep-aration between data objects and 
transactions that act on them. The architecture is designed for robust interoperability across 
domains, in an open and shared Internet computing infrastructure. A notable feature supporting 
cross-domain applications... Read complete abstract on page 2. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, and the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thorvaldsson, Haraldur D. and Goldman, Kenneth J., "Architecture and Execution Model for a Survivable 
Workflow Transaction Infrastructure" Report Number: WUCSE-2005-61 (2005). All Computer Science and 
Engineering Research. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research/977 
Department of Computer Science & Engineering - Washington University in St. Louis 
Campus Box 1045 - St. Louis, MO - 63130 - ph: (314) 935-6160. 
This technical report is available at Washington University Open Scholarship: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/
cse_research/977 
Architecture and Execution Model for a Survivable Workflow Transaction 
Infrastructure 
Haraldur D. Thorvaldsson and Kenneth J. Goldman 
Complete Abstract: 
We present a novel architecture and execution model for an infrastructure supporting fault-tolerant, long-
running distributed applications spanning multiple administrative domains. Components for both 
transaction processing and persistent state are replicated across multiple servers, en-suring that 
applications continue to function correctly de-spite arbitrary (Byzantine) failure of a bounded number of 
servers. We give a formal model of application execution, based on atomic execution steps, linearizability 
and a sep-aration between data objects and transactions that act on them. The architecture is designed 
for robust interoperability across domains, in an open and shared Internet computing infrastructure. A 
notable feature supporting cross-domain applications is that they may declare invariant constraints 
between data objects and furthermore declare dependencies on constraints maintained by other 
applications, leading to flexible, incidental atomicity between applications. The ar-chitecture is highly 
evolvable, maintaining system availabil-ity and integrity during upgrades to both application com-ponents 
and the system software itself. 
Department of Computer Science & Engineering
2005-61
Architecture and Execution Model for a Survivable Workflow Transaction
Infrastructure
Authors: Haraldur D. Thorvaldsson, Kenneth J. Goldman
Corresponding Author: kjg@cse.wustl.edu
Abstract: We present a novel architecture and execution model for an
infrastructure supporting fault-tolerant, long-running distributed applications spanning multiple administrative
domains. Components for both transaction processing and persistent state are replicated across multiple
servers, ensuring that applications continue to function correctly despite arbitrary (Byzantine) failure of a
bounded number of servers. We give a formal model of application execution, based on atomic execution steps,
linearizability and a separation between data objects and transactions that act on them.
The architecture is designed for robust interoperability across domains, in an open and shared Internet
computing infrastructure. A notable feature supporting cross-domain applications is that they may declare
invariant constraints between data objects and furthermore declare dependencies on constraints maintained by
other applications, leading to flexible, incidental atomicity between applications. The architecture is highly
evolvable, maintaining system availability and integrity during upgrades to both application components and the
system software itself.
Type of Report: Other
Department of Computer Science & Engineering - Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1045 - St. Louis, MO - 63130 - ph: (314) 935-6160
Architecture and Execution Model for a Survivable Workflow Transaction
Infrastructure
Haraldur D. Thorvaldsson Kenneth J. Goldman
Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering
Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130
{ harri, kjg }@cse.wustl.edu
Abstract
We present a novel architecture and execution model for
an infrastructure supporting fault-tolerant, long-running
distributed applications spanning multiple administrative
domains. Components for both transaction processing and
persistent state are replicated across multiple servers, en-
suring that applications continue to function correctly de-
spite arbitrary (Byzantine) failure of a bounded number of
servers. We give a formal model of application execution,
based on atomic execution steps, linearizability and a sep-
aration between data objects and transactions that act on
them.
The architecture is designed for robust interoperability
across domains, in an open and shared Internet computing
infrastructure. A notable feature supporting cross-domain
applications is that they may declare invariant constraints
between data objects and furthermore declare dependencies
on constraints maintained by other applications, leading to
flexible, incidental atomicity between applications. The ar-
chitecture is highly evolvable, maintaining system availabil-
ity and integrity during upgrades to both application com-
ponents and the system software itself.
1. Introduction
The Internet revolutionized computer networking by
providing a common, global communication infrastructure.
However, building dependable and secure applications on
top of it still poses a challenge, as witnessed by intermittent
availability of Internet-based services and attacks success-
fully breaching their security. Meanwhile, demand for glob-
ally distributed yet interoperable information systems has
long been growing, as has the realization that software ar-
chitecture paradigms for traditional centralized systems do
not easily carry over to distributed and decentralized ones.
This paper gives a formal model of a novel architecture
for a globally distributed, survivable and evolvable appli-
cation infrastructure, which we call Survivable Workflow
Transaction Infrastructure (SWFTI). It features a transac-
tional programming model, based on atomic execution steps
by active transaction components that monitor and modify
the state of passive object components. As an example, a
transaction in a workflow application might observe an in-
put queue object, process each item that is inserted into the
queue and deposit the result into another queue object. This
model is simple yet inherently concurrent, and is well suited
to cross-domain application workflow processing. Software
can be developed assuming a sequential, failure-free envi-
ronment and the infrastructure ensures linearizability and
failure recovery for all executions, within or across admin-
istrative boundaries.
A novel feature of SWFTI is that applications can declare
and depend on invariants between data objects, even across
domains, while providing non-interference guarantees for
independent applications in the shared infrastructure.
The architecture is designed to support continued, cor-
rect execution of long-running, distributed applications in
spite of failures and attacks. To achieve this, multiple
copies of both active and passive component are hosted
on server replicas running on independent physical host
servers. Replicas engage in an agreement protocol, ensur-
ing that all non-faulty replicas in the group take identical
steps. SWFTI tolerates the Byzantine failure of a bounded
number of replicas in a group, which includes both crashes
and erroneous behavior such as may result from software
bugs or intrusions by external attackers and malicious insid-
ers. This is the strongest fault model possible, since faulty
components may behave arbitrarily.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tions 2 and 3 discuss related work. Section 4 presents a se-
rial (centralized) model of SWFTI. Section 5 gives a model
of distributed SWFTI systems, with correctness formulated
in terms of the serial systems.
2. Related Work
This section discusses a Byzantine fault-tolerant algo-
rithm on which SWFTI builds, as well as related work in
Grid and peer-to-peer systems.
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2.1. Fault-tolerant state machines
The Byzantine fault-tolerance capability of SWFTI is
built upon CLBFT [6], a practical Byzantine agreement al-
gorithm for for deterministic replicated state machines in
asynchronous, distributed systems. Each replica group has
3f + 1 replicas, where at most f can be faulty [16, 5].
A replica r is correct with respect to a component v if it
correctly executes its (necessarily deterministic) implemen-
tation of v and sends and receives correct agreement proto-
col messages from enough correct replicas to reach agree-
ment. If a replica is not correct then we say it is faulty.
CLBFT makes the relatively weak assumption that the de-
lay for message delivery does not grow faster than real time.
This assumption is necessary since distributed consensus is
impossible with arbitrary message delays [10].
The CLBFT algorithm works roughly as follows: a client
sends a request to a designated primary replica server. The
primary sends a pre-prepare message with the request and
a sequence number to all replicas, who send a correspond-
ing prepare message to one another to ensure agreement on
the sequence number. Upon receiving 2f prepare messages
matching its pre-prepare message, a replica broadcasts a
commit message to all replicas. Upon receiving commit
messages from 2f + 1 replicas (possibly including its own)
a replica executes the request and sends the result to the
client. Upon receiving f + 1 matching results, the client
proceeds using that result value. Authenticity and integrity
of messages is protected using cryptographic signatures.
If a client times out waiting for a reply (possibly due to
a faulty primary) it broadcasts the request to all replicas,
which either reply with the return value (if the operation
was already committed) or forward the request to the pri-
mary and set a progress timer. If 2f replicas time out, all
correct replicas switch to another primary in a view change
operation and process the request using the new primary.
2.2. Grids and peer-to-peer systems
Grid computing [12] and peer-to-peer systems [2] have
the common objective of sharing and coordinating use of re-
sources within virtual communities [17, 11]. Grid research
has historically been driven by the need of the scientific
community to share instruments and distribute large com-
putations and data sets, while research in peer systems was
spurred by decentralized file sharing networks.
Grids have traditionally been cooperatively managed by
scientific communities of modest size, with implicit trust
among participants and only partially automated infrastruc-
ture and application configuration. Efforts are under way
to scale up and commercialize grids using emerging web
services standards [1].
Peer-to-peer systems have mainly been aimed at file
sharing and publication, with high scalability, decentral-
ized resource naming and in some cases, availability de-
spite node failures and user anonymity. Many systems use
distributed hash table (DHT) algorithms such as CAN [21],
Chord [23], Pastry [20] and Tapestry [25], for resource dis-
tribution and discovery. These enable efficient decentral-
ized lookup of an object by a key value (e.g., a file name).
Like Grids, SWFTI is designed to support arbitrary ap-
plication and service types, and like peer-to-peer systems,
it is designed to work on global scales with full decen-
tralization. The main objective of SWFTI though, is the
provision of a shared infrastructure for survivable exe-
cution of complex, long-running, distributed applications,
that interact with each other through persistent data ob-
jects. SWFTI achieves this through Byzantine fault-tolerant
replication of both processing and data, and by specify-
ing a robust, transaction-oriented execution model as an
integral part of its architecture (in lieu of e.g. commu-
nicating processes). Grids, in contrast, are fairly batch-
oriented, with limited or ad-hoc application-level support
for restarting failed processes and no tolerance of Byzantine
faults. DHT-based peer-to-peer networks are decentralized
and scalable by design but, to date, mainly support storage
and routing of static data and generally tolerate only fail-
stop failures, i.e. nodes halting or leaving the network.
The goals of SWFTI also differ significantly from
those of traditional distributed operating systems, such as
Amoeba [24], Chorus [22], Clouds [9], and the V distrib-
uted system [8]. These support a traditional programming
model by making a distributed system appear to the user as
if it were a uniprocessor, offering a full complement of oper-
ating system services. SWFTI in contrast, does not hide the
distributed nature of applications. Applications are written
in terms of transactions accessing distributed objects. Ob-
jects rely on their local hosts for whatever traditional oper-
ating system services they require for their implementation.
3. Background: I/O Automata
Since SWFTI targets high-availability and safety-critical
applications, we formally model its correct executions. This
provides an unambiguous specification of the execution
model, facilitating rigorously tested or verified system im-
plementations with high design and implementation diver-
sity. It also permits us to construct formal proofs that im-
plementations satisfy specific properties of the system, in-
creasing our confidence in them. Finally, a formal exe-
cution model enables rigorous reasoning about the appli-
cations running within the infrastructure, including system
services such as security and upgrade installations, etc.
Our model is based on I/O automata [18], so we provide
a short review. An I/O automaton is an (infinite) state ma-
chine whose state transitions are actions. An I/O automaton
signature S consists of a set of actions, denoted acts(S ),
partitioned into input actions, output actions and internal
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actions, denoted in(S ), out(S ) and int(S ), respectively.
Let ext(S ) = in(S ) ∪ out(S ) be the external actions of S.
An automaton a is a tuple (sig, states, start, trans, tasks),
with sig an automaton signature, states a (potentially infi-
nite) set of states, start a non-empty subset of states, trans a
state-transition relation, with trans ⊆ states × acts(sig) ×
states and tasks an equivalence relation on ext(S ). We ab-
breviate acts(sig(a)) as acts(a), and similarly for in, out
and so forth.
An execution fragment of a is a finite sequence s0,
pi1, s1, pi2, . . . , pir, sr or an infinite sequence s0, pi1,
s1, pi2, . . . of alternating states and actions such that
(sk, pik+1, sk+1) ∈ trans(a) for every k ≥ 0. An execu-
tion is an execution fragment beginning in a start state. An
execution α is fair if for each task partition C, α is finite
and all actions in C are disabled in α’s final state or α is
infinite and there are either infinitely many occurrences of
actions from C in α or infinitely many occurrences of states
in which all actions in C are disabled. Let execs(a) and
fairexecs(a) be the set of all executions and fair executions
of a, respectively.
The trace of an execution α of a, denoted trace(α), is
the subsequence of α consisting of all the occurrences of
actions from ext(a). Any two finite execution fragments
α, α′ of a where α′ begins with the last state of α may be
concatenated (less the last state of α) to yield another exe-
cution fragment of a, denoted α · α′. The occurrence of an
action pi in an execution or trace is called a pi event.
An action pi ∈ int(a) ∪ out(a) is enabled in state
s ∈ states if there exists transition (s, pi, s′) ∈ trans , for
some state s′ ∈ states . Input actions are always enabled
by definition, so for every pi ∈ in(a) and state s ∈ states
there is a tuple (s, pi, s′) for some s′ ∈ states. The actions
in in(a) ∪ out(a) are called the local actions of a, and a is
said to be quiescent in state s if none of its local actions are
enabled in s.
A collection {ai}i∈I of automata may be composed to
form a new automaton a if the signatures of each pair
ai 6= aj are compatible, meaning that each internal or out-
put action is under the control of a single automaton. For-
mally, a collection {Si}i∈I of signatures (indexed by some
countable set I) is compatible if for each pair Si and Sj
with i 6= j we have int(Si) ∩ acts(Sj ) = ∅, out(Si) ∩
out(Sj ) = ∅ and each action is contained in finitely many
sets acts(Si). The signature of the composed automaton
a has out(a) =
⋃







i∈I out(ai). The states of automa-
ton a are defined as the Cartesian product of the states of its





i∈I start(ai). trans(a) is the set of
triples (s, pi, s′) such that for all i ∈ I , if pi ∈ acts(ai) then
(si, pi, s′i) ∈ trans(ai) otherwise si = s′i, with si denoting
the part of state s “belonging” to ai. The task equivalence
classes of the component automata become the equivalence
classes of a, that is:
⋃
i∈I tasks(ai).
Given an execution fragment α and some set of actions
A we define the projection of α on A, denoted α|A, as the
subsequence of α comprised of all adjacent states and tran-
sitions pir, sr where pir ∈ A. Similarly, for a trace β we de-
fine β|A as the subsequence of β comprised of all actions in
A. The projection α|ai of an execution α of a composition
automata a on one of its component automata ai is defined
as α|acts(ai), with each state sr replaced by the the state
of ai in sr. Similarly, the projection β|ai of a trace β of a
is defined as β|ext(ai ). It can be shown that executions and
traces of a yield executions and traces of ai when projected
on ai, for each i ∈ I . Conversely, given an execution αi for
each i ∈ I and a sequence β of actions in ext(a) such that
β|ai = trace(αi) for each i ∈ I , there is an execution α of
a such that trace(α) = β and α|ai = αi for each i ∈ I .
Furthermore, if β is a sequence of actions in ext(a) such
that β|ai ∈ traces(ai) for each i ∈ I , then β ∈ traces(a).
These theorems enable modular reasoning about executions
and traces of composite automata.
4. Serial SWFTI systems
This section describes two formal models of SWFTI in
a sequential execution environment, to lay the groundwork
for defining correctness for distributed systems. Our base
model is a serial system with a fixed set of components.
Most information systems are not static, though, but are
continually upgraded and and evolved to meet the needs of
their users. The second model, therefore, extends the first
one to an evolvable system, whose set of components may
vary over time. Section 5 will describe the distributed and
the replicated SWFTI systems, with correctness defined in
terms of the evolvable and distributed system, respectively.
4.1. Components and operations
Objects and transactions are modeled with object and
transaction automata, respectively. Let VO and VT be dis-
joint, infinite sets of object identifiers and transaction iden-
tifiers, respectively. Let V denote VO ∪ VT . Let A(v) de-
note the automaton corresponding to v, for any v ∈ V . We
use the letters o, t and v to denote elements of VO, VT ,
and V , respectively, and to denote corresponding automata
A(o), A(t) and A(v), when clear from context.
An object automaton o is a deterministic I/O automaton
that defines one or more operations that model, for example,
object methods. Each operation has an operation signature
f(~P ) : W , consisting of an operation name f , a tuple ~P =
(P1, P2, . . . , Pn) of parameters types and a return type W .
We use the dot notation o.f(~P ), to denote an operation f
and its object o.
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An object o may have multiple requests pending. To en-
sure that request and responses are correctly matched up, o
has an infinite set of request input actions for each opera-
tion f in o and each tuple ~p of parameters for f , denote by
qofi(~p) for each i ∈ N. Similarly, for each request action
qofi in o and each possible return value w of f , o has an
infinite set of response output actions, denoted rofi(~p) : w.
The external actions of each object o are comprised
solely of request actions (requests, for short) and response
actions (responses, for short). The operations of each ob-
ject automaton o are partitioned into accessors and muta-
tors. Intuitively, mutators can affect the future externally
observable behavior of o whereas accessors cannot.
Since the internal state of object automata is opaque, we
let Do denote the domain of user-view states of any object
o ∈ VO. A user-view state is some representation of an
object’s state that can be stored and passed around in the
system. All objects have the accessor getData() : Do and
mutator setData(Do) : ∅. The getData operation returns
the user-view state corresponding to the current state of an
object and the setData operation sets the current state of an
object to one corresponding to the given user-view state. We
say that object o is in user-view state d if the getData oper-
ation of o would return d. We define that all states resulting
from a setData response action are start states of that ob-
ject. As a corollary, for any reachable user-view state of an
object o, there is a reachable state of o which is a start state.
We define a set ∇ of exceptional return values, that in-
dicate run-time failures, deprecated operations or invalid
parameters and other unexpected conditions that an object
cannot handle. An operation whose signature has return
type W is allowed to return any value in W ∪∇.
A transaction automaton t is a deterministic I/O automa-
ton that invokes object operations through operation calls,
consisting of a pair of request and response actions. For
each operation f that t might call on some object o and
each tuple ~p of parameters of f , t has request output ac-
tions, denoted qtofi(~p), for each i ∈ N. For each request
output action qtofi in t and each possible return value w of
f , t has a response input action, denoted rtofi(~p) : w.
The external actions of each transaction automata t are
comprised of requests and responses, in addition to the input
action createt and the two output actions requestCommit t
and requestAbort t. The createt action starts the execu-
tion of t while the other two terminate it, signalling suc-
cess or failure, respectively. Transaction t is quiescent
before a createt action and after an requestCommit t or
requestAbort t action.
A transaction may evaluate a Boolean expression over
object accessor return values to determine whether mutat-
ing operations should be called. Our definition is general
enough to permit various styles of transaction implementa-
tions, e.g. using explicit guards and effects or conventional
sequential programming constructs.
For each object or transaction automaton v ∈ V , let
requests(v) and responses(v) denote the set of request and
response actions, respectively, in acts(v).
For any transaction t ∈ VT , we say that the set of objects
on which t calls accessors only is the read set of t, denoted
R(t), and that the set of objects on which t calls at least one
mutator is the write set of t, denoted W (t). Note that R(t)
and W (t) may have elements in common.
4.2. Serial, static system
We define correct executions of the serial system, which
serve as a correctness condition for the executions of the
evolvable system. Since the modeling of the latter re-
quires components to be dynamically created, destroyed
and evolved, we proceed as if all possible component au-
tomata were a part of the model from the beginning. Only
the (finite) set of automata that “exist” in a SWFTI system
appear in its executions. Automata that have not yet been
added or that have been removed are in a quiescent state,
so their actions never appear in system executions. This is
more convenient than trying to model the creation or mod-
ification of I/O automata, and is the approach adopted in
[14, 19], for example.
4.2.1 Serial scheduler
We define for any U ⊆ V a serial scheduler automaton
schedU , that schedules transactions in U for execution,
through their create actions. Essentially, schedU treats all
components in V \ U as non-existent. We wish to support
concurrent scheduling of multiple “instances” of a particu-
lar transaction automaton. Therefore, when schedU intends
to invoke a transaction t ∈ U , it actually schedules a func-
tionally equivalent invocation automaton tj instead, but the
result is the same as if t had been scheduled directly. This
also simplifies our definition of execution correctness, since
we can project traces directly onto transaction invocations.
Scheduler schedU picks a fresh tj each time, e.g. by using
some j greater than any which schedU has already used.
For each t ∈ VT and each j ∈ N let tj denote the in-
vocation automaton that is identical to t except each of its
actions has been subscripted with j. For example, createt
is renamed to createtj . Let VI denote the set of all such
automata for all t ∈ VT .
Operations on objects inU may be requested by the envi-
ronment, which represents operation calls issued by clients
(e.g. end-user principals) external to the system. We denote
a request or response action of a client e for operation f of
o by reofi and qeofi, respectively, for any integer i ≥ 1.
Since our model captures external operation calls, nei-
ther invocation automata nor clients share actions with ob-
ject automata directly. Instead, for each o ∈ V there is a
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request handler rho that mediates operation requests and re-
sponses between o and transaction invocations and clients.
For each request action qofi ∈ requests(o) and response
action rofi ∈ responses(o), rho has output actions qofi
and input actions rofi, respectively, for each integer i ≥ 1.
It also has input actions qtofij and an output action rtofij , re-
spectively, for each transaction invocation tj ∈ VI . Finally,
it has input actions qeofi and output actions reofi, respec-
tively, for each external principal e and each integer i ≥ 1.
When a request action qtofij or qeofi occurs in a request
handler, it eventually forwards it to o as a qofi event. When
it gets a corresponding response rofi it eventually forwards
it back to tj or e as an rtofij or reofi event, respectively.
4.2.2 Serial execution
We use serial, sequential executions as the base model
for correctness due to their intuitiveness, simplicity and
tractability in formal reasoning.
For any subset U ⊆ V let UO denote the objects in U ,
and let UI denote the set of transaction invocation automata
for the transactions in U . For any finite U ⊆ V we define
the serial system automaton ASU as the composition of the
automata in UO ∪ UI , the request handlers of the objects
in UO and the schedU scheduler automaton, using stan-
dard I/O automata composition [18]. To prevent transac-
tions from calling non-existing objects we require that each
transaction automata t ∈ U only refers to objects in U , that
is: R(t) ∪W (t) ⊆ U .
An execution αt of a transaction invocation tj is well-
formed if trace(αt) = pi · β1 · β2· . . . ·βn · pi′, where
pi = createtj , for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have that βk is a trace
of the form qtofij(p), qofi(p), rofi(p), rtofij(p), for some
operation f on some o ∈ R(t) ∪W (t), parameter list p of
f and some integer i ≥ 1, and pi′ = requestCommit tj or
pi′ = requestAbort tj .
A well-formed client call fragment is an execution frag-
ment αe such that e is a principal and trace(αe) has the
form qeofi(p), qofi(p), rofi(p), reofi(p), for some opera-
tion f on some o ∈ R(t)∪W (t), parameter list p and some
i ∈ N.
The steps of different transactions and client calls are
not interleaved in a serial system execution. More formally,
let a well-formed call fragment be a well-formed client call
fragment or a well-formed transaction invocation execution.
An execution α of ASU is a serial execution if trace(α) is
a concatenation of the traces of well-formed call fragments,
with action createtj appearing at most once for any j ≥ 1.
A transaction t is terminating if each execution αt ∈
execs(t) is finite. Similarly, an object o is terminating if
each execution of an object operation is finite, i.e. each ex-
ecution fragment qofi . . . rofi appearing in execs(o) for an
operation f on o is finite. In practice, we expect all correct
components to be terminating.
An execution of a transaction invocation tj is partitioned
into two execution fragments, which we call the guard and
the effect, respectively. We define the guard as consisting
of zero or more accessor operations on objects in R(t). We
define the effect as begin empty or a sequence of accessor
operations on objects in R(t) and mutator operations on ob-
jects in W (t), beginning with a mutator operation.
4.2.3 Linearizability and fairness
Although SWFTI admits non-serial concurrent executions,
we want all executions to be linearizable [15]. An execu-
tion α ∈ execs(ASU ) is linearizable if there exists a serial
execution α′ ∈ execs(ASU ) such that for each transaction
invocation tj ∈ VI we have trace(α)|tj = trace(α′)|tj .
Said another way, the two executions “look the same” to all
transaction invocations, so they cannot tell the difference
between the concurrent execution and the serial one.
We also want our specification to capture the notion that
all transactions get fair turns to perform execution steps and
that all pending object operations are eventually performed.
We therefore let each serial system automaton ASU have
for each transaction invocation tj ∈ UI an internal action
pitj , which is always enabled. A pitj event schedules tj for
execution, and we put all the scheduling actions for a par-
ticular transaction t ∈ U in the same task partition of ASU .
Furthermore, we put each request handler rho for each ob-
ject o ∈ U in a task partition of its own. This ensures that in
any α ∈ fairexecs(ASU ), all transactions and objects get
fair turns to execute.
4.3. The computation graph
Intuitively, the connections between transactions and ob-
jects correspond to the flow of information and causality in
the system; the behavior of a transaction is influenced by
the data it accesses and its mutating operations on objects
influence the future behavior of those objects.
We say that the components of V induce a computation
graph G = (VO + VT , E); a directed, bipartite graph over
V , with its vertices partitioned into VO and VT . Each edge
(v1, v2) ∈ E represents potential operation calls between
v1 and v2. For any o ∈ VO and t ∈ VT , E has an edge from
t to o iff o ∈W (t) and an edge from o to t iff o ∈ R(t). For
any v ∈ V , Let Ein(v) and Eout(v) be the incoming and
outgoing edges of v, respectively. Let E(v) = Ein ∪ Eout,
the incident edges of v.
Properties of the flow of information in G may be stat-
ically analyzed, to prevent information “leaks” and reason
about the impact of changes to components, etc. Formally,
for any path p ⊆ E connecting two objects o1, o2 ∈ VO,
let the corresponding node path be the set of components in
V incident to any edge in p. Let pathsT (o1, o2) denote the
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union of all node paths from o1 to o2 using only edges inci-
dent to transactions in T , for any T ⊆ VT and let spanT (o)
be the union of all such node paths beginning at an object o.
A simple property we can state is that if o2 /∈ spanVT (o1)
then information cannot leak within G from object o1 to o2.
4.4. Constraints and dependencies
A SWFTI application is some subgraph of G, and each
object or transaction in V belongs to exactly one applica-
tion. Let A be an infinite set of application identifiers and
for any component v ∈ V , let app(v) denote its application.
Applications may require invariants to be enforced
across multiple data objects, e.g. to ensure that each mem-
ber of one collection has a corresponding member in an-
other collection. We want the transactions that maintain an
invariant to appear to run atomically with transactions that
mutate objects involved in the invariant. To this end, we al-
low such transactions to be designated as constraints. Let
constr ⊆ VT be the set of constraints.
We augment our definition of correct serial executions to
support constraints. Roughly, if an application A ∈ A in-
cludes a constraint t and some other transaction or sequence
of constraints in A updates an object o ∈ R(t), then we
require that no other transaction of A can witness a state
in which o has been modified and t has not yet executed.
Moreover, we allow an application to declare the fact that
its correct execution depends upon invariants enforced by
the constraints of other applications. We say that incidental
atomicity occurs when an application A uses objects up-
dated by constraints in applications that A depends on.
Constraints and dependencies are a powerful mecha-
nism, since the developer of an application can define such
constraints without having any control over the implemen-
tation of the objects involved and without any knowledge
about other applications that may mutate them. Implemen-
tations have options for how and when a particular con-
straint is enforced, i.e. by running it as a sub-transaction
of transactions writing to its read set or more lazily, as other
transactions later access objects in its write set.
We formally state the correctness condition for serial ex-
ecutions with constraints and dependencies. The acyclic ap-
plication dependency relation includes pair (a1, a2) only if
application a1 depends on application a2, which we write
as a1 ≺ a2. Let ≺∗ denote the transitive, reflexive closure
of ≺ and let depends(A) denote the set of applications on
which A (transitively) depends, the set {B ∈ A | A ≺∗ B}.
Let constrA denote the set of constraints relevant to A, the
set {t ∈ constr | app(t) ∈ depends(A)}.
Let β be the trace of any serial execution of serial system
ASU , for some U ⊆ V . Let βs be any subsequence of β
with βs = qofi · β′ · qtpgj , where f is a mutator of some
object o and g is an operation on some object p and i, j ∈
N. Then, if t ∈ constrA for some application A and p ∈
spanconstrA(o) then either there is no request from t to o
in β′ or β′ contains a createsk action, for each constraint
s ∈ pathsconstrA(o, p) and some k ∈ N.
4.5. Application non-interference
Although SWFTI applications execute in a shared in-
frastructure, the correct execution of an application should
not have to rely on the correctness (safety and liveness) of
other, unrelated applications. Yet, certain undesirable inter-
actions may result when linearizability is realized through
concurrency control, e.g. when an object needed by one
application is locked by a transaction in another.
We want to provide non-interference guarantees for in-
dependent applications. Specifically, we wish to guarantee
that an application A cannot be blocked by an application
B /∈ depends(A). The idea is that by declaring a depen-
dency on the applications in depends(A), the developer of
A has expressed a measure of trust in these applications,
whereas other applications remain untrusted.
We say that a SWFTI system guarantees
non-interference if for any transaction t ∈ A,
if t is terminating and all transactions in⋃
v1,v2∈R(t)∪W (t) pathsconstrA(v1, v2) are terminating
and all objects {o ∈ R(t)∪W (t) | app(o) ∈ depends(A)}
are terminating, then all invocations of t will terminate.
4.6. Evolvable, serial system
A serial system automaton ASU models a static SWFTI
system. We now define the evolvable serial system automa-
ton AE, that allows system components to be added, re-
moved and changed during the course of an execution.
We define the evolvable serial scheduler sched∆ as shar-
ing create actions with all transaction invocation automata
in VI . Scheduler sched∆ keeps in its state the set of au-
tomata that it considers to currently exist and be candidate
for scheduling. A component is “created” or “destroyed” by
adding or removing it from that set, respectively.
We introduce persistent names for components, so we
can “modify” an automaton by mapping an existing com-
ponent name x to a different automaton. Formally, let N
be an infinite set of component names (names, for short).
Scheduler sched∆ stores a finite, injective system compo-
nents function N 7→ V in its state, relating names of ex-
isting component to their automata. Let N and V denote
respectively the names and components appearing in the do-
main and range of that function and let VO = V ∩ VO and
VT = V ∩ VT . Scheduler sched∆ only schedules transac-
tions in VT for execution.
We define AE as the composition of all of the automata
in VO∪VI , the request handlers of the objects in VO and the
sched∆ scheduler automaton, using standard I/O automata
composition.
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Let α be an execution of AE. For any state s ∈
α let syscomp(s) denote the components function of
sched∆ in state s. We call any execution fragment
si, pii+1, si+1, pii+2, . . . , pii+n, si+n appearing in α where
for all i ≤ k ≤ i+n we have syscomp(sk) = syscomp(si)
a stable interval of α. A similar definition applies to any
infinite execution fragment si, pii+1, si+1, pii+2, . . . and i ≤
k. If a finite or infinite stable interval is not a subsequence
of any other stable interval of α then it is a maximal stable
interval of α.
The following claim captures the idea that the executions
of AE consist of sequences of normal, linearizable appli-
cation execution steps interspersed by evolution steps that
modify the system components function.
Claim 1: Let α ∈ execs(AE ) = α0 ·pi1 ·α1 ·pi2 · . . . ·pin ·
αn, where for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n execution fragment αk is a
maximal stable interval of α. (note that each pik is a system
evolution step of α, transitioning between states with non-
identical component functions). Let sk0 denote the starting
state of interval αk of α.
If for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n, Vk = syscomp(sk0) comprises
a valid serial system and action pik follows a call fragment
then αk is a linearizable execution of ASVk 1. The proof is
based on concatenation of (serial) executions and the fact
that there exists by definition an execution starting in any
user-view state of a serial system (Section 4.1).
5. Distributed SWFTI System
This section describes and formally models a possible
implementation of an evolvable SWFTI system where com-
ponents are assigned to replicated servers, whose replicas
each execute on a physical host.
There are two main aspects of a distributed SWFTI sys-
tem. The logical system consists of components, applica-
tions, constraints and application dependencies. The con-
figuration determines how that logical system is partitioned
into logical servers and how the servers are replicated and
mapped to physical hosts.
More formally, a distributed SWFTI system is a tuple
Y = (logsys, config), where logsys is the logical system
and config the physical system. We let logsys be a tuple
L = (comp, app, constr ,≺), where comp maps names to
components, app a function mapping components to appli-
cations, ≺ an application dependency relation and constr
the subset of transactions in VT that are constraints. We let
config be a tuple C = (server , reps, host , impl), where
server is a relation partitioning the components in V , reps
maps the partitions to (logical) replica servers, host maps
replica servers to host server machines and impl maps com-
ponents and replicas to software implementations.
1All but the last fragment are trivially fair, since they are serial and end
in a quiescent state after a response action.
After presenting the system model we describe how its
structure is encoded in the state of data objects within the
system itself.
5.1. Servers, Replicas and Hosts
We assume a domain S of named logical servers
(servers, for short), that we use to partition the elements
of V . The server relation of C is a finite function N 7→ S ,
mapping each component name x ∈ N to the one server in
S that hosts component comp(x). Let comps(s) be the set
{x ∈ N | server(x) = s}. Due to non-interference re-
quirements, all the components on a particular server must
belong to the same application. That is, for any server s and
all v ∈ comps(s)we require that app(v) = A, withA some
application identifier in A. The partitioning into servers is
thus a subpartition of the partition into applications.
Each server is implemented by a non-empty set of server
replicas (replicas, for short), drawn from a domain R of
named replicas, that can execute software and communi-
cate with other replicas over a network. The reps relation
of C is a finite injection S × R, mapping each s in server
to one or more replicas that implement s, called the replica
group of s. Since each replica is (a part of) the implemen-
tation of at most one server, we let server(r) denote s, for
any replica r ∈ reps(s). Also, let comps(r) be a short-
hand for comps(server(r)) and reps(x) a shorthand for
reps(server(x)), for any x ∈ N .
Let the neighboring servers neigh(s) of a server s be
the set of servers hosting a component adjacent to some
component hosted on s, in G. Let the neighboring replicas
neigh(r) of a replica r be the set of replicas implementing
the neighboring servers of server(r).
Although replicas are in most respects the ultimate hosts
of servers and components, we define them as being “vir-
tual” machines on physical host machines (hosts, for short),
drawn from a domain H of named hosts. The host relation
of C is a finite relation R 7→ H, mapping each replica r for
which reps is defined to the one host in H that runs r. A
host may run multiple replicas for different servers, but we
assume that replicas on the same machine are completely
isolated from one another, e.g. through server virtualization
[3]. Let reps(h) be the set of replicas running on h, for any
h ∈ H. Let hosts(v) denote the set of hosts that run some
r ∈ reps(v), for any v ∈ V .
5.2. Implementations
Let Iv be the set of implementations of an object or trans-
action automaton v ∈ V , and I the union of all such imple-
mentations. An implementation mv ∈ Iv is some repre-
sentation of v that can be stored and executed on physical
hosts.
An object implementation mo provides implementations
of each of the operations of o. A transaction implemen-
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tation mt calls operations on the object implementations
corresponding to objects in R(t) ∪ W (t). Each execu-
tion of a transaction implementation mt corresponds to
the execution of a fresh invocation automaton tj ∈ VI .
Implementation mt implements the operation create() :
{commit , abort}, which resets mt to its beginning state,
makes an arbitrary number of operation calls on object im-
plementations and terminates, returning an indication of
success or failure.
We define the execution of a transaction implementation
mt as the alternating sequence of operation calls it makes
and the return values passed back to it. Similarly, an ex-
ecution of an object implementation mo is the alternating
sequence of operation calls made on it and the return values
it passes back.
For any implementation mv ∈ Iv we let execs(mv )
denote the set of all possible executions of mv , that is:
executions of mv that could result given the right se-
quence of requests or return values, for transaction and
object implementations, respectively. Implementation mv
correctly implements component v if for each execu-
tion of o1.f1(~p1), w1, o2.f2(~p2), w2, . . . , on.fn( ~pn), wn ∈
execs(mv ) there exists an execution in execs(v) with trace
qo1f1i1(~p1), ro1f1i1(~p1):w1, qo2f2i2(~p2), ro2f2i2(~p2):w2,
. . . , qonfnin( ~pn), ronfnin( ~pn):wn, with each ij some in-
teger for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. This strict correspondence is required
since CLBFT depends on all implementations of a compo-
nent behaving deterministically the same.
An object implementation mo necessarily implements
the pair of operations setData and getData, allowing object
implementations to initialize their internal state in accor-
dance with the passed-in user-view state (encoded in some
generally agreed way [7] and to return their current user-
view state, respectively.
The impl relation of C is a finite relation N ×R 7→ I,
mapping components and replicas to implementations.
5.3. System objects
The configuration of a SWFTI system is stored in data
objects within the system itself. This simplifies implemen-
tation and affords configuration state the same Byzantine
fault-tolerant protection as application state. It also serves
as a mechanism for reflection, allowing applications to ob-
serve and modify system state. Such modifications, called
system evolution steps (described in Section 4.6), occur
through atomic operation calls on system objects, ensuring
security and fault-tolerance for evolution steps.
The relations of a system Y are partitioned and mapped
onto system objects, in a way that reflects the distribution
of SWFTI system implementations. We define the projec-
tion of system Y onto a server s in Y as a SWFTI system Ys,
whose relations map subsets of the domains of each relation
in Y to the same values as the synonymous relations in Y .
Specifically, relations comps, constrs, ≺s, servers, repss,
hosts and impls of Ys are defined respectively for the do-
mains {x | x ∈ comps(s)}, {x | x ∈ comps(s) ∩ constr},
{app(s)}, {x | x ∈ comps(s)}, {s}, {r | r ∈ reps(s)}
and {(x ∈ comps(s), r ∈ reps(s)}. For each server s
in Y there is a server object named xs, that stores in its
state the comps, constrs, ≺s, repss, impls and hosts rela-
tions of Ys. Server object xs is hosted on server s, that is
server(xs) = s. The server relation of Y corresponds to
component data in server objects, that is, server(x) = s iff
(x, s) ∈ comps.
The implementation of server objects represents the
SWFTI replica system software that runs in (a virtualization
compartment on) the host. The exception is the implemen-
tation of the server objects for host servers, which represent
the host’s hypervisor software. Since system software is in-
cluded in configurations, it may be modified using normal
system evolution mechanisms.
5.4. Distributed scheduling
In a distributed system each server makes it schedul-
ing decisions autonomously. We fix for each logical server
s ∈ S a distributed server scheduler automaton scheds,
that schedules transactions in comps(s) (if any) for execu-
tion. Each scheduler shares actions with the request han-
dlers of all objects in VO, as serial schedulers do. We define
the distributed system automaton AD of a system Y as the
composition of all the automata in VO∪VI , the request han-
dlers of the objects in VO and the distributed schedulers for
each server in Y .
An execution α ∈ execs(AD) is correct if there exists
a linearizable execution α′ of AE such that trace(α) =
trace(α′) and for each state e ∈ α there exists a valid dis-
tributed SWFTI system Y such that the projection of Y
on each server s ∈ S corresponds exactly to the relations
stored in the state of server object xs in state e. The lat-
ter condition states that the system state encoded in server
objects always corresponds to a well-formed system.
Claim 2: If the object request handlers in the system use
a standard concurrency control (locking) algorithm CCY
then each execution of AD corresponds to an execution of
a corresponding evolvable system AE. The proof is based
on standard concurrency control theory [4] as in [19] then
executions of AD will be linearizable.
5.5. Distributed, replicated system
A replicated SWFTI employs multiple replicas of each
server and a Byzantine fault-tolerant agreement protocol
that synchronizes the state of the replicas so that they ef-
fectively simulate a single, centralized server.
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5.5.1 Extended CLBFT algorithm
To accommodate the replication of active clients, we ex-
tended the CLBFT protocol (Section 2.1) roughly as fol-
lows [13]. Let fc and fs be the number of faulty client and
server replicas tolerated, respectively. The client replicas
run CLBFT to agree on the operation to perform as well as
a designated sender replica, that will send results back to
client replicas, obviating the need for all server replicas to
reply to all client replicas. The client replicas send their re-
quest to the primary server replica, which, if it receives at
least fc + 1 matching requests, proceeds to run the opera-
tion using CLBFT. The server replicas send their (signed)
results to the designated sender, which, if it receives at least
fs + 1 matching results, relays them to all client replicas.
If client replicas time out waiting for a reply, they send
their request directly to all server replicas, circumventing a
potentially faulty designated sender. The clients then agree
on a new designated sender during the subsequent opera-
tion.
5.5.2 Replica group correctness
We define the correct executions of a replicated system.
We define for each replica r two replica automata: a
server replica automaton Asr for the objects of server(r)
and a client replica automaton Acr for the transactions of
server(r). A replica automaton defines the logic for a
Byzantine fault-tolerant replication algorithm and controls
the input actions of its components. Each replica automa-
ton has independent instances of its components, so we in-
troduce the set VR of replica-subscripted components, that
has for each component v ∈ V and each replica r ∈ R an
automaton vr that is identical to v except each of its actions
has been subscripted with r. Let VRI be the set VI extended
in the same way. Note that replica automata are generic,
each server and client replica automaton is identical to re-
spectively every other server or client replica automaton,
except its actions are subscripted with an identifier r ∈ R.
A replica automaton A communicates with another
replica automaton A′ through a pair of channel automata
cAA′ and cA′A, for messages from A to A′ and from A′
to A, respectively. A channel automaton represents an
asynchronous communication link for replica protocol mes-
sages, that may reorder or duplicate messages but always
delivers any message deposited into it to the recipient in a
finite amount of time.
We define the replicated system automaton AR of a sys-
tem Y as the composition of the component replica au-
tomata for each r ∈ R, the components in VRO ∪ VRI and
a pair of channel automata for each pair of distinct replica
automata. We say that a protocol message between a client
and server replica is sent or received, respectively, when it
is added to or removed from a channel automaton, respec-
tively.
Claim 3: Suppose the server replica automata of AR
use the same concurrency control algorithm CC Y used to
ensure linearizability of executions of AD. Then any exe-
cution of AR corresponds to some linearizable execution of
AD.
We sketch the proof, which is by construction of an exe-
cution trace β′ ∈ traces(AD) for any execution trace α ∈
execs(AR). Let QR be the set of all request and response
actions of replica-subscripted components, that is the set⋃
v∈VR requests(v)responses(v). Let β = trace(α)|QR.
We build β′ from an initially empty β′ by scanning β, mes-
sage by message from the beginning, counting protocol
messages sent and received for request and responses and
appending events to β′. Let f(v) be the maximum num-
ber of faulty replicas tolerated by replica group reps(v), for
any v ∈ V . Let |q|n and |r|n denote the number of mes-
sages containing request or response q or r, respectively, in
the prefix of β of length n. If, as a result of scanning the
n-th event in β, we have |qtofij(~p)|n = f(t) + 1, we make
that the serialization point for the sending of the request, by
appending qtofij(~p) to β′. Similarly, if |rtofij(~p) : w|n or
|rofi(~p) : w|n reaches f(t) + 1 or f(o) + 1, respectively,
we append rtofij(~p) : w or rofi(~p) : w to β′, respectively.
Finally, if |qeofi(~p)|n or |reofi(~p) :w|n reaches 1 or f(o)+1,
respectively, we append qeofi(~p) or reofi(~p) :w to β′, respec-
tively. Note that only a single external request is needed, as
external clients are not replicated, by definition.
We cannot, however, use a qofi(~p) message in AR as the
serialization point for the reception and execution of the re-
quest, since in the replicated system it signifies agreement
on the order of the request with respect to other requests,
not its execution. We therefore expand QR to include mes-
sages of the form 〈prepare(q)〉r, which are sent by a server
replica r after it has received 2f prepare messages match-
ing its own message for q. This is when the sequence num-
ber for the request is irrevokably decided and the request
is prepared. Though operations are executed strictly in or-
der, they may become prepared out of order. Therefore,
suppose that as a result of scanning a message with request
q = qofi(~p) for an object o ∈ comps(s), request q is pre-
pared with sequence number m. Let l be the lowest request
sequence number for s for which we have not yet added a
request to β′. If now for each l ≤ k ≤ m request qk for s
with sequence number k is prepared, then we append each
qk to β′, in increasing order.
We note that the concurrency control algorithm CC Y
used for AD can also be used for AR [14]. We claim
that for any execution α ∈ fairexecs(AR), our construc-
tion yields an execution α′ ∈ execs(As) such that (i)
α′ is linearizeable; (ii) α′ is a correct execution of AD
and (iii) α′ ∈ fairexecs(AD). Claim i) holds, since our
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construction goes from a linearizeable execution of AR
and chooses serialization points such that the operation re-
sponses received by each transaction in α′ are the same
as those received by the transaction replicas in α. To
show ii) and iii) we appeal to two properties of E-CLBFT,
that are proven in a separate paper [13], namely (a) The
composition
∏
r∈reps(s)Asr × VRO of the server replica
automata for a server s ∈ S simulates the composition∏
o∈comps(s)∩VO A(o)×
∏
o∈comps(s)∩VO rho × scheds of
the corresponding objects and request handlers and dis-
tributed scheduler for server s in AD and (b) The com-
position
∏
r∈reps(s)Acr × VRI of the transaction replica
automata for a server s ∈ S simulates the composition∏
t∈comps(s)∩Vt A(t) × scheds of the corresponding trans-
action invocations and distributed scheduler for server s in
AD. This enables us to argue that for any interaction be-
tween the replicas for a pair of servers s1, s2 ∈ S our con-
struction will yield an execution in AD where the same in-
teractions take place.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
We have described the architecture of SWFTI, an in-
frastructure for survivable applications, that uses replicated
physical hosts to tolerate a bounded number of Byzantine
faulty hosts.
We described its transactional programming abstraction,
based on active transaction components with transient state
performing atomic operations on passive object components
that persistently retain their state. The infrastructure allows
replication of both data objects and the active transaction
components acting on them, so that fault-tolerance is ex-
tended to the whole of an application, not just its state. This
is particularly valuable for long-running application that
must maintain progress in spite of failures and attacks. Sys-
tem evolution is explicitly captured in the execution model
and configuration state is survivably maintained in data ob-
jects within the system itself, with evolution steps occurring
as atomic object operations.
We defined formally the executions of a serial and static
SWFTI system, including fairness and a novel way to spec-
ify transitive, inter-application invariant constraints. We de-
fined the correctness of an evolvable, replicated system in
terms of tree increasingly abstract models. The replicated
system simulates the distributed system, which simulates
the evolvable serial system, which simulates a sequence of
static serial systems.
We are currently working on a reference implementa-
tion of our architecture, to validate its feasibility and per-
formance. We are also working on algorithms for non-
interfering concurrency control and for secure, atomic and
scalable upgrades of SWFTI applications and system soft-
ware, as well as the fully decentralized security subsys-
tem underpinning the security of evolution and application
processing in general.
References
[1] Globus Alliance Open Grid Services Architecture.
http://www.globus.org/ogsa/.
[2] S. Androutsellis-Theotokis and D. Spinellis. A survey of
peer-to-peer content distribution technologies. ACM Com-
put. Surv., 36(4):335–371, 2004.
[3] P. Barham, B. Dragovic, K. Fraser, S. Hand, T. Harris,
A. Ho, R. Neugebauer, I. Pratt, and A. Warfield. Xen and the
art of virtualization. In SOSP ’03: Proceedings of the nine-
teenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles,
pages 164–177, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.
[4] P. A. Bernstein, V. Hadzilacos, and N. Goodman. Concur-
rency Control and Recovery in Database Systems. Addison-
Wesley, February 1987.
[5] G. Bracha and S. Toueg. Asynchronous consensus and
broadcast protocols. J. ACM, 32(4):824–840, 1985.
[6] M. Castro and B. Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance. In Third Symposium on Operating Systems Design and
Implementation (OSDI), New Orleans, Louisiana, February
1999. USENIX Association, Co-sponsored by IEEE TCOS
and ACM SIGOPS.
[7] M. Castro, R. Rodrigues, and B. Liskov. Base: Using ab-
straction to improve fault tolerance. ACM Trans. Comput.
Syst., 21(3):236–269, 2003.
[8] D. Cheriton. The V distributed system. Communications of
the ACM, 31(3):314–333, 1988.
[9] P. Dasgupta, J. R. J. LeBlanc, M. Ahamad, and U. Ra-
machandran. The Clouds Distributed Operating System.
Computer, 24(11):34–44, 1991.
[10] M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, and M. Merritt. Easy impossibil-
ity proofs for distributed consensus problems. In PODC ’85:
Proceedings of the fourth annual ACM symposium on Prin-
ciples of distributed computing, pages 59–70, New York,
NY, USA, 1985. ACM Press.
[11] I. Foster and A. Iamnitchi. On Death, Taxes, and the Conver-
gence of Peer-to-Peer and Grid Computing. volume 2735,
pages 118–128, Jan 2003.
[12] I. Foster, C. Kesselman, and S. Tuecke. The Anatomy of the
Grid: Enabling Scalable Virtual Organizations. Int. J. High
Perform. Comput. Appl., 15(3):200–222, 2001.
[13] K. Goldman, S. Pallemulle, and I. Wehrman. Forthcoming.
Technical report, 2005.
[14] K. J. Goldman and N. Lynch. Quorum consensus in
nested-transaction systems. ACM Trans. Database Syst.,
19(4):537–585, 1994.
[15] M. P. Herlihy and J. M. Wing. Linearizability: a correct-
ness condition for concurrent objects. ACM Trans. Program.
Lang. Syst., 12(3):463–492, 1990.
[16] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease. The Byzantine Gen-
erals Problem. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 4(3):382–
401, 1982.
[17] J. Ledlie, J. Shneidman, M. Seltzer, and J. Huth. Scooped,
Again. volume 2735, pages 129–138, Jan 2003.
10
[18] N. Lynch and M. Tuttle. An Introduction to Input/Output
Automata. CWI Quarterly, 2(3):219–246, Sep 1989.
[19] N. A. Lynch, M. Merrit, W. E. Weihl, and A. Fekete. Atomic
Transactions. Morgan Kaufmann, August 1993.
[20] A. R. P. Druschel. Pastry: Scalable, distributed object loca-
tion and routing for large-scale peer-to-peer systems. Nov
2001.
[21] S. Ratnasamy, P. Francis, M. Handley, R. Karp, and
S. Schenker. A scalable content-addressable network. In
SIGCOMM ’01: Proceedings of the 2001 conference on
Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for
computer communications, pages 161–172, New York, NY,
USA, 2001. ACM Press.
[22] M. Rozier, V. Abrossimov, F. Armand, I. Boule, M. Gien,
M. Guillemont, F. Herrman, C. Kaiser, S. Langlois,
P. Le´onard, and W. Neuhauser. Overview of the Chorus Dis-
tributed Operating System. In Workshop on Micro-Kernels
and Other Kernel Architectures, pages 39–70, Seattle WA,
1992.
[23] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Liben-Nowell, D. R. Karger, M. F.
Kaashoek, F. Dabek, and H. Balakrishnan. Chord: a scal-
able peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications.
IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., 11(1):17–32, 2003.
[24] A. Tanenbaum, M. Kaashoek, R. Renesse, and H. Bal. The
Amoeba Distributed Operating System, 1990.
[25] B. Zhao, L. Huang, J. Stribling, S. Rhea, A. Joseph, and
J. Kubiatowicz. Tapestry: a resilient global-scale overlay
for service deployment. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, 22(1):41–53, Jan 2004.
11
